Using the Wrong Model to Examine Iraq
He rightly makes the argument that war is counterintuitive to the business thinker. Overwhelming force often saves more lives for the winning side than “just enough troops.”William J. Stuntz, writing in the Weekly Standard, Doubling Down in Iraq, talks about using the wrong model to describe how we have gone into the war in Iraq. He makes a good case that the business model, “In the world of business, decisions are made at the margin: a little
more invested here, a bit less there; everywhere, strive to cut waste,
to spend no more than is absolutely necessary.”
Stuntz adds,”Counterinsurgency warfare is more about protecting than killing–like a nationwide exercise in community policing. And the lesson of the 1990s in American cities is that the best way to reduce the level of criminal violence is to put more cops on the street. The lesson of the past three years in Iraq is the same: If the goal is to cut our losses, the best move is not to pull back, but to dive in–flood the zone, put as many boots as possible on the most violent ground. Do that, and before long, the ground in question will be a good deal less violent.”I would argue, probably a nitpick with Thomas Barnett’s sysadmin force terminology, that until the insurgents are reduced to a level that they are no more a threat than any other small time criminal, the war ain’t over. The main combat may have ended, but that doesn’t mean the fighting is over. You might not need all the heavy forces, but you need lots of the infantry forces that can do the work of war at the retail level.
In fact, the whole reason for the change in tactics by insurgents is to neutralize the effectiveness of the heavy weapons.
The business model isn’t an apt analogy to counterinsurgency, or any type of war for that matter.
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